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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1)

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN EXCLUDING (EXCLUDING FOR

A RAPE CRISIS WORKER), ALL SPECTATORS, INCLUDING ALL OF DEFENDANT'S FAMILY, FROM THE COURT DURING THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTRIX, AND IN FURTHER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL ON THOSE GROUNDS.

2)

DOES U.C.A. 78-7-4 VIOLATE THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION WHERE IT IS INTERPRETED AS ALLOWING THE EXCLUSION OF ALL SPECTATORS IN A TRIAL FOR RAPE.

3)

IS U.C.A. 78-7-4 SO CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM THAT IT

CANNOT BE APPLIED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH UTAH AND UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was charged and convicted of rape in a trial
that commenced on March 13, 1986 in Utah County before the
Honorable Boyd L. Park.
After the jury was sworn and opening statements made,
the prosecution moved to clear the courtroom of spectators,
including the family of the defendant for so long as the
prosecutrix was to testify, save for a Rape Crisis Center
worker (Transcipt, Page 17, Line 18) pursuant to U.C.A. 1953,
78-7-4.
The defense counsel objected twice to the motion (Transcript
Page 18, Line 7) and (Transcript Page 20, Line & ) . The trial
court granted the motion and the court was so cleared of
all spectators excluding the Rape Crisis worker.
The defendant was sentenced and his motion for a new
trial on the issues above was denied June 10, 1986.

The

defendant appeals the denial of his motion for new trial
and the granting of the trial motion to exclude the spectators.
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STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT

It has been held that U.C.A. 78-7-4 does not apply to
criminal trials in that it is violative of Section 12,
Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Excluding spectators, including the family of defendant,
violates the Constitution of the United States and of Utah.
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ARGUMENT

The appellant is seeking review of a trial court's
decision to exclude all spectators from the courtroom during
a rape victim's testimony where those spectators are family
and friends of the defendant and of the victim and there
is no evidence of disturbance or adverse behavior of those
spectators.
Necessarily excluded from the issue is a discussion of
when and how far a judge may go in excluding spectators who
may or do cause disturbances or intimidation or when merely
casual or perversely interested spectators may be excluded.
This Court has acknowledged the defendant's right to
a public trial in rape and other cases as being founded
upon the Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec. 12 and the Sixth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, State v. Harding,
635 p.2d 36 (1981).
In State v. Bonza,72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, the courtroom
was cleared or spectators (save the sister of the prosecutrix)
after the prosecutrix became hysterical.
the exclusion was lifted.

Later in the trial

The Court concluded that the

defendant was denied a public trial.
In the case at bar, the trial judge excluded all spectators during the prosecutrix's testimony but unlike Bonza
there was no reason stated.

The prosecution stated in the

instant case (Trial Transcript Page 17, Line 21) that the
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prosecutrix was "nervous" and that she was probably going to
be intimidated by the presence of her family and the defendant's family but there is no indication the trial judge made
a finding of that or that it was even considered by the
trial judge.
In any event, the appellant contends that unless there
is a showing of acts of intimidation by the family of the
prosecutrix or the defendant, that exclusion would be
improper and indeed the constitutional safeguard of a public
trial is in part designed to provide a degree of intimidation in the sense that spectators help deter perjury and
other miscarriages of justice, State v. Harding, Supra.
State v. Beckstead, 88 P.2d 461,
(concurring opinion p. 464). The harm of the exclusion
in the case at bar was that those persons that should have
been present were excluded for no justifiable reason and that
the reason the prosecution wanted them excluded is one of the
most important reasons the Constitutional provisions were
drafted to encourage their presence.
In State v. Beckstead, 88 P.2d 461, the Court held that
in prosecutions of an intimate sexual nature (referring to
U.C.A. 78-7-4) that a reasonable number of defendant's family
and friends must be left in the courtroom during such testimony, the Statute notwithstanding.
This Court has ruled that where a defendant has been
denied a public trial, his prejudice is presumed, and he
-6-

need not show actual prejudice.

State v. Jordan, 57 Utah 612,

196 P. 525.
In Jordan, supra, as in the instant case, the trial judge
apparently ruled for complete exclusion on the basis of the
Statute (both cases involve rape and the Statutes are essentially the same).

The Jordan case, supra, the Beckstead case,

supra, and the Bonza case, supra, dealt with what is now
codified as U.C.A. 78-7-4.

The cases in Utah have uniformly

held that it is improper to rely on the Statute to exclude
interested, non-obtrusive spectators.
U.C.A. 78-7-4 has been interpreted in the above cases
in various ways as to insure the constitutional rights of
defendants.

However, the Statute itself, in granting discre-

tion to a trial court to exclude, should be invalid on its
face as well as applied in the instant case and similar cases.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should remand this case back to the trial
court for a new trial because the defendant was denied
a public trial.

Respectfully submitted,

John R'. Bucher
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